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S-2
Options for the Pakistan Navy
Commander Muhammad Azam Khan, Pakistan Navy (Retired)
We have unresolved issues, a history of conflict and now the Cold Start
doctrine. Help us resolve these issues. We want peaceful coexistence
with India. India has the capability and intentions can change
overnight.
GENERAL ASHFAQ P. KAYANI, THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF, PAKISTAN
Around noon on 26 July 2009, Gurushuran Kaur, the wife of the Indian primeminister, broke a single coconut on the hull of a submarine in the fifteen-
meter-deep Matsya dry dock at Visakhapatnam (also known as Vizag).1 The oc-
casion marked the formal launch of India’s first indigenously built submarine, a
six-thousand-ton nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) known
as S-2—also as the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) and, more commonly, by
its future name, INS Arihant (destroyer of the enemy).2 The launch ended for In-
dia a journey stretching over three decades since the inauguration of the ATV
program and including an eleven-year construction period.3
The submarine is intended to form a crucial pillar of India’s strategic deter-
rence. Successful trials and integration of S-2’s systems will establish the final leg
of India’s nuclear weapons delivery triad, as articulated in the Indian Maritime
Doctrine and substantiated in the Indian Maritime
Military Strategy Doctrine.
The launch is an extraordinary development for
the littorals of the Indian Ocean region, including
Australia and South Africa, but especially for Paki-
stan. It is germane to the military nuclearization of
the Indian Ocean and noticeably dents the strategic
balance; it has the potential to trigger a nuclear arms
race.4 S-2 will also enhance India’s outreach and allow
New Delhi a comprehensive domination of the Ara-
bian Sea, the Indian Ocean littoral, and even beyond.5
Commander Khan’s twenty-three years of commis-
sioned service included thirteen years at sea as a surface
warfare officer and several command and staff appoint-
ments. He saw action in the first Gulf War, serving with
the United Arab Emirates navy. He is a graduate of the
Pakistan Naval Academy class of 1973 and of the Paki-
stan Navy War College and National Defense College,
Islamabad. He holds a master’s in war studies (mari-
time). Since his retirement in 1998 he has extensively
contributed to Pakistani as well as overseas periodicals
and media. He is currently a research fellow at the Paki-
stan Navy War College.
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Costing US$2.9 billion, the ATV project was a joint effort involving the Indian
Navy and several government agencies and private organizations.6 India’s nu-
clear submarine is the world’s smallest of its type yet will pack a megaton punch.
The boat is driven by a single seven-bladed, highly skewed propeller. Special
anechoic rubber tiles (to reduce the risk of detection by sonar) coat the steel
hull.7 A similar technology was previously used in the Russian Kilo-class subma-
rines.8 (Russian help in designing the ATV has long been an open secret; there
are also reports of Israeli, French, and German imprints on the project.)9
But more than design or fabrication of hull, it was the downsizing and mating
of the ninety-megawatt (120,000 horsepower) low-enriched-uranium-fueled,
pressurized light-water reactor that kept the submarine in the dry dock for more
than a decade.10 The reactor and its containment vessel account for one-tenth
(nearly six hundred tons) of the boat’s total displacement. The hydrodynamics
of a vessel with a tenth of its weight concentrated in one place posed a formida-
ble naval engineering challenge indeed, one that plagued the program.
Before being commissioned as INS Arihant in late 2011 or early 2012,
S-2—serving as a technology demonstrator, a test for future boats of the
class—will have to obtain appropriate certification in three crucial areas: stealth
features, adequacy of the reactor design, and missile range. The first key test will
involve meticulous calibration of S-2’s underwater noise signature, which will
determine the degree of its invulnerability to detection and therefore its suitabil-
ity as a ballistic-missile platform. This process may necessitate extensive trials,
adjustments, and design modifications—if not for S-2, certainly for its succes-
sors.11 The second vital area requiring attestation will be to determine the reac-
tor’s fuel cycle—that is, the frequency of replacement of the fuel rods. Being of a
first- or second-generation technology, with a shorter fuel cycle, the S-2 reactor
fundamentally affects the boat’s performance as an instrument of deterrence.12
The replacement of fuel rods is an intricate operation requiring a submarine to
be taken out of its operational cycle for an extended period. The net result will be
that either the submarine’s patrol areas will remain restricted (fairly close to
base) or its endurance (deployment period) will be curtailed.
The third assessment of S-2 will entail test-firing and validation of missile pa-
rameters. The platform is currently configured to carry a Pakistan-specific,
two-stage submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Sagarika (Oce-
anic), expected to become operational after 2010.13 This nuclear-capable missile,
powered by solid propellants, is a light, miniaturized system, about 6.5 meters
long and weighing seven tons.14 S-2 will have to accommodate missiles not only
of greater (intercontinental) range but in greater numbers if it is to have a deter-
rent value against China. That would require further underwater launches and
flight trials for the follow-on units of the class.15
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NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND THE INDIAN NAVY
The Indian Navy began strongly advocating nuclear-related programs at sea in
the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests, and for a valid and legitimate reason—the
need for an invulnerable nuclear capability to undergird a posture of “no first
use.” At a press conference in 2002, the Indian Navy chief held that “any country
that espouses a no first use policy (as India does) must have an assured second
strike capability. All such countries have a triad of weapons, one of them at sea. It
is significant that the Standing Committee on Defence of the twelfth Lok Sabha
[lower house of the Indian Parliament] had advised the government ‘to review
and accelerate its nuclear policy for fabricating or for acquiring nuclear subma-
rines to add to the (nation’s) deterrent potential.’”16
When in January 2003 the major elements of India’s official nuclear doctrine
were brought into the public domain, the Indian government stressed the build-
ing and maintenance of a “credible minimum deterrent,” along with a posture of
“no first use.”17 Nuclear retaliation to a first strike was to be “massive and de-
signed to inflict unacceptable damage.” Significantly, however, the 2003 state-
ment did not reiterate the 1999 draft nuclear doctrine’s aim of building a nuclear
triad, although all three armed services were keen to deploy nuclear-capable
weapon systems.18
If the Indian Navy was disappointed at the lack of official sanction for its
submarine-based nuclear deterrent, it tried hard not to show it. Still, the ATV
project was under way, with funding and guaranteed political support from the
government. It could therefore be concluded that this notable doctrinal silence
might have been an attempt not to alarm the international community about In-
dia’s multidimensional nuclear program.19
India’s Monroe Doctrine
More than ever, India today demonstrates a striving for regional and global emi-
nence. In elucidating India’s Maritime Military Strategy, the former Indian Navy
chief Arun Prakash pleaded with Indians to keep it “‘etched in [their] minds that
should a clash of interests arise between India and any other power, regional or
extra-regional . . . the use of coercive power and even conflict remains a distinct
possibility.’ Such ‘Kautilyan’ statements lend credence to [the] notion of a for-
ward-leaning India that increasingly inclines to hard power solutions to re-
gional challenges.”20
In their nation’s novel bid for sea power, Indians look for inspiration to the
Monroe Doctrine, the nineteenth-century U.S. policy declaration that the New
World was off-limits to new European territorial acquisitions or any reintroduc-
tion of the European political system.21 An identical philosophy for India was
first proclaimed by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru in a speech in 1961
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justifying the use of force to evict Portugal from Goa: “Any attempt by a foreign
power to interfere in any way with India is a thing that India cannot tolerate, and
that, subject to her strength, she will oppose. That is the broad doctrine I lay
down.”22 Nehru’s statement was in fact a veiled warning to all external powers
against any action anywhere in the region that New Delhi might perceive as im-
periling the Indian political system. His injunction against outside interference
laid the intellectual groundwork for a policy of regional primacy, without med-
dling by or influence of external powers. Though at the time it was impossible
for India to confront the imperial powers militarily, each succeeding generation
in India has interpreted and applied this foundational principle, according to its
own appraisal of the country’s surroundings, interests, and power.
While the success or otherwise of India’s Monroe Doctrine can be debated, it
has remained an “article of faith for many in the Indian strategic community”
and now seems to have entered the Indian foreign-policy lexicon.23 The Monroe
Doctrine itself being an intensely maritime concept (the influential nineteenth-
century sea-power theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan was an outspoken disciple),
India has made huge strides in expanding its sea power in recent times. In the
process, New Delhi has largely shed its continental way of thinking and reori-
ented itself to look beyond the nation’s shores.24 Thus today, in the words of
President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, “The economic growth of this region depends on
the heavy transportation in the Indian Ocean particularly the Malacca strait.
Navy has an increasing role to provide necessary support for carrying out these
operations.”25
Advancing the Monroe Doctrine
Regional prominence requires India to develop a robust and self-sustaining do-
mestic military industrial and technological complex, one that removes de-
pendence on overseas sources. Such an infrastructure must be fully able to
sustain the fleet twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and 365 days a year.
In that direction, India’s strategic partnership with Washington, including the
civilian nuclear deal, is likely to be of great assistance over time. In the short
term, however, and taking advantage of the presence of the U.S. Navy, which ef-
fectively reduces its own burden, the Indian Navy projects a fleet comprising
three carrier battle groups.26 As Admiral Madhvendra Singh, chief of staff of the
Indian Navy, declared on 14 October 2003, “Fulfilling India’s dream to have a
full-fledged blue-water Navy would need at least three aircraft carriers, 20 more
frigates, 20 more destroyers with helicopters, and large numbers of missile cor-
vettes and antisubmarine warfare corvettes.”27 These battle groups could be or-
ganized into a single fleet, depending on New Delhi’s tolerance for risk and the
Indian Navy’s ability to keep the fleet in a high operational state.28 Six new and
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a few older-vintage destroyers, twelve new and a few old frigates, corvettes,
patrol craft, and five new tank landing ships (LSTs) are likely to feature in such
an order of battle.
All the new Indian Navy warships, including its projected carriers, will be
much more formidable than their predecessors.29 The Indian Defence Ministry
has furthermore recently approved three billion dollars to strengthen the navy’s
littoral war-fighting capabilities.30 The move represents a push for a larger pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean but may also be a response to a more active Chinese
presence there.
In the long term, a self-sufficient Indian Navy ably backed by a domestic de-
fense industrial complex may feature six to nine carrier task forces and more
than a dozen nuclear submarines. In the meantime, the Indian Navy is likely to
continue expanding its undersea nuclear deterrent, manifest in fleet ballistic-
missile submarines, with nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), though
able to operate throughout the Indian Ocean basin and beyond, taking lower
priority.31
IN PERSPECTIVE: PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR POLICY
Henry Kissinger argues, “The persistence of unresolved regional conflicts makes
nuclear weapons a powerful lure in many parts of the world—to intimidate
neighbors and to serve as a deterrent to great powers who might otherwise inter-
vene in a regional conflict.”32 Unlike India—whose nuclear program is widely
believed to be status driven—Pakistan’s nuclear policy is entirely security
driven, and it is India-centric. The national discourse on the direction, aims, and
objectives of nuclear policy are, however, veiled and mainly confined to official
circles. Accordingly, public debate is very generic, in contrast to India’s volumi-
nous material in print on the subject.33 The decision not to enunciate publicly a
comprehensive nuclear doctrine reflects in part the fact that Pakistan sees no
political or status utility in nuclear capability, but rather a purely defensive,
security related purpose.
“Pakistan’s threat perceptions stem primarily from India, at the levels of
all-out conventional war, limited war, and low intensity conflict. Within the nu-
clear framework, Pakistan seeks to establish deterrence against all-out conven-
tional war.”34 In other words, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is directed against
not only a possible Indian nuclear attack but a conventional one as well.35
Among key characteristics of Pakistan’s nuclear policy are maintenance of a
minimum level of nuclear deterrence, retention of a first-use option, and reli-
ance on ground and air delivery (aircraft and missiles).36 Sea-based delivery
means are appreciably missing.
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Like NATO, Pakistan continues to keep its options open on “no first use,” but
has declared willingness to use nuclear weapons as a weapon of last resort. “No
first use” declarations have never been the basis of determining the true posture
of any nuclear-weapon state. If they were, New Delhi would have accepted the
position of China on this issue as well as the latter’s assurances of nonuse of nu-
clear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.37
In late 2001, Pakistan declared four broad conditions under which Islamabad
might resort to use of nuclear weapons, as described by Lieutenant General
Kidwai of the Strategic Plan Division (the secretariat of the National Command
Authority):38 a “space threshold,” should New Delhi attack Pakistan and conquer
a large part of its territory; a “military threshold,” if India destroyed a large part
of Pakistan’s land or air forces; an “economic threshold,” were India to pursue
the economic strangulation of Pakistan; and finally, should India push Pakistan
into “political destabilization or [create] a large scale internal subversion.”39
The Pakistan Navy and Pakistan’s Nuclear Program
The May 1998 tit-for-tat nuclear tests by Pakistan in the Ras-Koh mountain
range in the Chagai district of Balochistan restored the strategic balance in
South Asia.40 The period that followed saw the quarrelsome neighbors expand
their respective arsenals, improve their command and control infrastructures,
and strive for better CEP (circular error probability), greater mobility and faster
reaction time for missiles, and higher yield as well as better yield-to-weight ratios
for the warheads.41
Significantly, no efforts to develop a sea-based nuclear capability and thus ex-
pand the survivability of nuclear forces have ever surfaced in Pakistan’s policy
making. The principal reason for this is perhaps historical “baggage”—a fixa-
tion on Afghanistan, in search of strategic depth as against a geographically
larger India. But 9/11 was a rude awakening that such a policy was not only un-
sound but no longer tenable. By then precious time (1998–2001) that could have
gone toward developing undersea deterrence had been lost.
The “military threshold” postulation in Pakistan’s declared nuclear philoso-
phy surmises the destruction of a large portion of Pakistan’s “land and air com-
ponents” as an inducement to go nuclear. The destruction of a major
component of naval forces, however, remains unstipulated. Three deductions
could be reached: that the navy continues in its usual low priority in the overall
national security calculus, that the possibility of international reaction has pre-
cluded a clear articulation of the naval component, and that the naval case is in-
cluded in the threshold of “economic strangulation.”
But the term “economic strangulation” is broad and can be interpreted in
various ways. Pakistan being an agrarian economy, a prolonged disruption or
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drastic reduction in the flow of cross-border rivers by India could impinge on
crop yield, triggering widespread unrest, destabilization, and a possible con-
frontation.42 But a far more perilous scenario, one that could cause economic
strangulation more quickly, resides at sea.
The Pakistan Navy: A Sentinel of Energy and Economic Security?
Pakistan’s commerce, like India’s, is intrinsically seaborne. More than 95 percent
of Pakistan’s trade by volume, 88 percent by value, is transported by sea.43 Three
sea lines of communication support Pakistan’s maritime trade, viz., from the Far
East, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. These arteries carry both imports and ex-
ports. The imports include edible oil, tea, sugar, wheat, and other value-added
foodstuffs. During the last fiscal year (FY), $3,662,000,000 was spent on food
imports alone.44 Much of Pakistan’s oil also comes over the sea. The Gulf,
through which the country’s annual oil imports are shipped, constitutes the na-
tion’s energy lifeline. With a 5 percent annual growth rate, Pakistan’s oil imports
are likely to reach 22.2 million tons during FY 2010–11.45
During FY 2008–2009, the ports of Karachi and Qasim collectively handled im-
ports of 24.4 million tons of dry cargo and 20.9 million tons of liquid-bulk cargo,
totaling some 45.3 million tons. The sum of exports at these ports during the same
period was 18.3 million tons. In addition, the ports handled 1.9 million TEUs’
worth of containerized cargo.46 All in all, Pakistan’s critical overall dependence on
sea-based imports is a good deal greater than India’s. India’s superiority over Paki-
stan being most pronounced in the maritime field, a blockade of Karachi could se-
riously imperil the country’s economy and the war-fighting potential in two or
three weeks.47 Given all this and the role the Pakistan Navy is expected to play, it is
not difficult to deduce where one must expect Pakistan’s economic and energy se-
curity sensitivities—nay, economic threshold—to dwell.48
THE THRESHOLD AND CREDIBILITY ISSUES
According to Indian analysts, of the four threats that Pakistan has identified as ca-
pable of invoking nuclear response, only two—territorial loss and military
destruction—have credibility. To them, it is difficult to make nuclear escala-
tion credible against the other two (economic strangulation and national
destabilization). Consequently, they maintain, India might now focus on the
latter two and opt for controlled military pressure across the Kashmir Line of
Control.49 The thinking of Indian leadership also reflects a presumption that
should there be an escalation in tension between India and Pakistan, New
Delhi would have the unconstrained support of the international community.
These postulations are deeply flawed. Tension related to water resources is al-
ready heating up; Pakistan has complained that India is holding back the waters
M U H A M M A D A Z A M K H A N 9 1
NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:02 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
7
Khan: S-2: Options for the Pakistan Navy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
of rivers flowing from Indian-administered Kashmir. Left unresolved, in due
course the issue will be clubbed together with the Kashmir dispute.50 Any re-
duced water flow would then be perceived as a ploy to put additional pressure on
Pakistan; the response would be equally unmeasured and misdirected.51 Like-
wise, tampering with Pakistan’s sea-lanes could work safely only to an extent.
Any large-scale internal unrest on account of food shortages or effective cessa-
tion of commercial activity due to blockage of fuel supplies through Karachi
would most certainly engender a response beyond a certain point. Once public
pressure mounted, Pakistan’s chief security stakeholders would be bound to re-
act. In a state of panic or nervousness, a freakish response could not be ruled out.
A destabilized state in Pakistan’s main urban centers would be a godsend for
the lethal cocktail of militant groups hoping to reenact “26/11” (as the 26–29
November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai is known). The existing imbroglio in
Karachi is an apt example. Perennially simmering with ethnic and sectarian vio-
lence, the metropolis now hosts one of the world’s largest Pashtun concentra-
tions. Scores of Taliban and al-Qa‘ida insurgents fleeing Malakand, South
Waziristan, and now Helmand have found sanctuary there.52 The recent arrests
in Karachi of some top leaders of Afghan Taliban and al-Qa‘ida (including those
of Mullah Baradar and Ameer Muawiya by Pakistani and American intelligence
forces) are demonstrations of this fact.53
The 26/11 attack lifted off from the shores of Karachi. Its alleged perpetrator,
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is now a formidable terror enterprise, endeavoring to
compete with al-Qa‘ida. It has relations with factions of the Taliban and several
other jihadi outfits.54 The organization is also believed to have developed the ca-
pacity to launch sea-based operations. According to reports the founding leader
of LeT, Hafiz M. Saeed, wanted by India for involvement in the Mumbai attacks,
has suddenly resumed his activities, mouthing venomous anti-India slogans and
promising to liberate Kashmir.55 Also, with tens of thousands of fishing boats,
small craft, and other unregulated commercial traffic plying continuously along
the coasts of Sindh, Makran, Gujrat, and Maharashtra, coastal security in the
area is deeply exposed, despite efforts on both sides since 2008.56 Making the
most of volatility and coastal vulnerabilities, Karachi-based insurgents could or-
chestrate a new terror assault on India, to provoke a reprisal.57
That the international community will always back New Delhi against Paki-
stan is, however, a misplaced notion. India may well take a leaf from the recent
NATO Military Committee meeting in Brussels, where Pakistan not only scored
a military/diplomatic triumph but effectively truncated India’s strategic gains in
Afghanistan.58
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IS COERCION WORN OUT?
Since the overt exhibitions of their nuclear potentials in 1998, Pakistan and In-
dia have returned from the brink on three occasions. The years since then have
also been studded with diplomatic standoffs. The Kargil conflict in 1999 re-
mained a local affair, with the two armies and air forces battling it out on and
over the frozen peaks. The Indian Navy too played a role as an instrument of co-
ercion. In June 1999, its Western Fleet was reinforced with elements from the
Eastern Fleet, prompting Pakistan Navy to go on full alert. A beefed-up Indian
Navy force later conducted exercises in the northern Arabian Sea. Also—the
lone Indian carrier, INS Viraat, being in refit—trials of the use of a con-
tainership deck as a platform for Sea Harrier aircraft were carried out in Goa.
The aims of these exercises were to demonstrate the buildup of the Indian Navy’s
strength to the Pakistan Navy and to display its assets and readiness for all-out
conflict. Between 21 and 29 June 1999 the Indian Navy deployed missile ships
and corvettes in a forward posture. Expecting economic blockade, the Pakistan
Navy escorted national oil tankers and commenced surveillance sorties along
the coast.59 International pressure and a 4 July accord in Washington finally con-
strained Pakistan to withdraw to its original position.60
In December 2001 an attack on the parliament in New Delhi induced India to
amass four-fifths of its armed forces along the borders with Pakistan. Islamabad
reacted in kind.61 The two sides remained “eyeball to eyeball” for almost ten
months before India decided to stand down.
In the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the Indian leadership was seen
spitting fire, threatening Pakistan with a punitive action. News of possible surgi-
cal strikes by the Indian Air Force deep inside Pakistan, against the major urban
center of Lahore and nearby Muridke, site of the headquarters of LeT, was rife.
The incident also brought to a halt the peace process that had begun in June
1997. The tense period saw Indian generals enunciating provocative new mili-
tary doctrines and its army conducting “Cold Start” exercises on the borders. Yet
all this failed to draw the intended concessions from Pakistan.62 India may have
received a nudge from Washington, but by now, after fourteen long months, the
prolonged face-to-face was having a telling impact on both sides. Coercion had
run out of steam, reached a tipping point. New Delhi indicated willingness to re-
sume parleys.63
It is clear that repeated application of coercion is rendering the instrument
ineffective. Both sides maintain their critical territorial-cum-ideological stand-
points, stemming mainly from the Kashmir issue. Pakistan is not going to allow
its own subjugation, and the Pakistan Army is not going to yield to Indian de-
mands on issues that it deems central to the nation’s ideology.64 For its part, and
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for reasons of politics and regional clout, India must point to Kashmir unrest as
externally abetted and all terror attacks as radiating from Pakistan. The persis-
tence of the respective stances of each side is further reinforced by the fact that
the risks and consequences of nuclear escalation have not yet sunk into the col-
lective minds of the two societies; nuclear devastation still remains largely an ab-
stract concept. As a result there is no effort to deal with the issue of nuclear-war
risk, independent of the Kashmir issue.65 There was no comparably dangerous
territorial stake for the nuclear adversaries of the Cold War.
THE OPTIONS
Pakistan’s security situation is precarious, and the future is not bright. On one
hand, the differences between Washington and Islamabad that lately irked and
angered the latter now seem to be thawing.66 But on the other, New Delhi’s stra-
tegic interests being “exactly aligned” with those of Washington, India is getting
extensive mileage out of Pakistan’s current predicament.67 Despite the recent
diplomatic successes, then, Pakistan’s choices, if it is to address strategic asym-
metry and ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces, are contracting rapidly.
Pakistan’s existing means of delivering nuclear strikes are susceptible to air
and missile attacks. The Indian air defense system—potentially including the
Prithvi Air Defence capability and the upcoming U.S.-Israeli-Russian Ballistic
Missile Shield—reduces the possibility of penetration by either missiles or fight-
ers.68 The option of missiles with multiple warheads also is open to debate. For
now, the dispersal of the nuclear arsenal poses a question mark. The cutting-
edge technologies in the Indian inventory—surveillance means like IRS satel-
lites and the MiG-25, the day/night-capable Israeli surveillance satellite RISAT,
along with platforms like the Phalcon AWACS, Su-30 aircraft, etc.—put its value
in question.
Nonetheless, the recent parleys in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) threaten to freeze the imbalance in
the stocks of these materials of Pakistan and India to the distinct advantage of
the latter. New Delhi gains from the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and a consequent
Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver that has allowed India to conclude agreements
with countries Russia, France, and more recently the United Kingdom to supply
it with nuclear fuel.69 Pakistan’s resource imbalance, geographic disproportion
(differences in landmass), and now the launch of S-2 provide India a convincing
capacity to strike all over Pakistan from the deep south while ensuring the sur-
vivability of its own forces.70 In the absence of Pakistani potential to deliver a nu-
clear riposte, an economic threshold would certainly be reached in days if
Pakistan’s sea-lanes, particularly from the Persian Gulf, were to be obstructed.
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Second Strike on board Conventional Submarines: The Agosta 90B
In October 2008, the chief of staff of the Pakistan Navy claimed that his service
was capable of deploying strategic weapons at sea.71 The details as to how strate-
gic or nuclear weapons would be deployed and whether Pakistan had developed
a capability to launch missiles from submarines were not disclosed. But it is
widely speculated that work on arming the Pakistan Navy’s conventional sub-
marines with nuclear-tipped missiles has been going on now for quite some
time. A sea version of the Babur cruise missile is thought to have been developed
by the country’s strategic organizations. If that is true, Pakistan would not be the
first country to arm conventionally powered submarines with such a capability.
Israel’s 1,900-ton Dolphin-class, German-origin submarines are believed to be
part of the country’s second-strike capability. They provide Tel Aviv the crucial
third pillar of nuclear defense complementing the country’s much vaunted land
and air ramparts.72
Pakistan Navy’s Agosta 90B, or Khalid-class, attack submarines (SSKs) carry
crews of highly skilled and professionally trained officers and men. The subma-
rines, designed by DCN (now DCNS) of France, are a version of the Agosta
series, with improved performance, a new combat system, and AIP (air-
independent propulsion) for better submerged endurance. A higher level of au-
tomation has reduced the crew from fifty-four to thirty-six. Other improve-
ments include a new battery, for increased range; a deeper diving capability of
320 meters, resulting from the use of new materials, including HLES 80 steel;
and a reduced acoustic signature, through the installation of new suspension
and isolation systems.73
Three Agosta 90Bs were ordered by Pakistan in 1994. The first, Khalid (1999),
was constructed in France; the second, Saad (2003), was assembled at the Naval
Dockyard (Karachi); and the third, Hamza (2008), was constructed and assem-
bled in Karachi. These submarines are equipped with diesel-electric propulsion
and the MESMA (Module d’Énergie Sous-Marin Autonome) AIP system.74 The
diesel-electric plant consists of two SEMT-Pielstick 16 PA4 V185 VG diesels,
providing 3,600 horsepower, and a 2,200-kilowatt electric motor driving a single
propeller.
Pakistan is the only country bordering the Indian Ocean to have acquired AIP
submarines. The two-hundred-kilowatt MESMA liquid-oxygen system in-
creases significantly the submerged endurance of the submarine at four knots.75
It consists essentially of a turbine receiving high-pressure steam generated by a
boiler that uses hot gases from the combustion of a gaseous mixture of ethanol
and liquid oxygen.76 The AIP suite causes an 8.6-meter extension of the original
67.6-meter hull, increasing the boat’s submerged displacement from 1,760 tons
to 1,980.77
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The Agosta 90B is equipped with a fully integrated SUBTICS combat system.
SUBTICS processes signals from submarine sensors and determines the tactical
situation by track association, fusion, synthesis, and management, as well as
trajectory plotting. This track management allows appreciation of the surface
picture by the commander and consequent handling of weapons-related com-
mand and control functions.
The Agosta 90B submarine has four bow-mounted 1Q63 A Mod 2 torpedo
tubes, 533 mm in diameter, and carries a mixed load of sixteen torpedoes and
missiles. The boat can also fire tube-launched SM39 Exocet subsurface-to-
surface missiles, capable of hitting targets out to twenty-seven nautical miles
(fifty kilometers) away. The sea-skimming missile has inertial guidance and ac-
tive radar homing and travels at 0.9 Mach.78 Target range and bearing data are
downloaded into the Exocet’s computer via SUBTICS. The boat can also launch
the DM2A4 wire-guided, active/passive, wake-homing torpedo, adding a new
dimension to its firepower. Targets up to forty-five kilometers away can now be
engaged.
In the short term (within five years), Pakistan Navy Khalid-class submarines
with their cutting-edge technology could be armed to carry nuclear-tipped
cruise missiles. Several formidable challenges would, however, have to be over-
come. Missile installation and subsequent integration with the onboard combat
system, as well as with the nuclear command-and-control infrastructure (C4I
network), could be daunting tasks.79 The combat system, meant for conven-
tional weapons, may require major changes to accommodate nonconventional
weapons. During operational deployments a Pakistan Navy submarine carrying
nuclear weapons would be under the operational control not of Commander
Pakistan Fleet, as in existing practice, but of the National Command Authority.
Perhaps a greater challenge would be ensuring foolproof communications
between the submerged submarine and the shore-based command. An elec-
tromagnetic pulse following a nuclear burst would disrupt the earth’s elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, resulting in a partial or complete breakdown of com-
munications, including shore–submarine. The problem is compounded by the
absence of domestic communications satellites. A very-low-frequency (VLF)
communications system can provide an answer, to some extent.80 A sustained
program of tests and trials would be needed to develop a robust communica-
tion system that can sustain such a contingency.
The submarine’s crew, obviously specially selected, would also require exten-
sive training in handling all kinds of unforeseen events, developing standard op-
erating procedures and planning ways to minimize uncertainty on board in the
absence of communications.81 Test firings of missiles will be required to ensure
crew confidence as well as weapon-systems credibility.
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Numerous issues of a technical as well as an operational nature will thus have
to be addressed at each tier to integrate the vessel fully into national strategic
forces. Close cooperation and coordination between the Development and Em-
ployment Control committees under the National Command Authority and
strategic organizations like the Kahuta Research Laboratories, the National En-
gineering and Scientific Commission, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Re-
search Organization, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the Maritime
Technology Complex, and the National Development Complex will also be es-
sential at every step. These organizations will have to rise above intra-
establishment rivalries and jealousies that could get in way of smooth and timely
achievement of milestones.
A word of caution may be in order here. The Pakistan Navy once enjoyed a
sharp edge over the Indian Navy’s conventional submarines, like the Soviet-
designed Foxtrot-class boats, which were noisier than the French submarines
operated by Pakistan. But the Indian Navy has not only been catching up but is
now on the verge of surpassing Pakistani submarines. Its French Scorpènes are
supposedly a generation ahead of the Agosta 90B.82 On a positive note, however,
the recent introduction of advance platforms like the SAAB Erieye airborne
early warning and control system and Il-78 refuelers by Pakistan Air Force, be-
sides bolstering Pakistan’s strategic capability both on land and at sea, will sig-
nificantly strengthen the nation’s air defenses.83
Employing the P-3C
The P-3C Orion long-range maritime-patrol aircraft (LRMP) has a proven mar-
itime surveillance and reconnaissance record that dates back to the Cold War.
Several old and new versions of the aircraft continue to serve in more than eigh-
teen countries, including the United States. It is a turboprop, multidimensional
aircraft commonly known to the naval community as an “airborne destroyer.”
The Pakistan Navy first acquired P-3Cs in 1991. The present inventory is suit-
ably modernized and equipped with cutting-edge sensors and weapons to track,
identify, and hunt surface and subsurface targets. The aircraft can carry a mixed
payload of eight Harpoon missiles and six torpedoes, besides mines and bombs.
It has endurance in excess of eighteen hours and can operate as low as three hun-
dred feet, making its detection quite difficult.
In the recent past, the Pakistan Navy brokered a fresh deal with the United
States for eight refurbished P-3Cs. In addition to improved sensors, a digital
tracking system, electro-optical and infrared sensors, a chaff dispenser, an elec-
tronic support measures (ESM) suite, and sonobuoy detection system, the new
batch of P-3Cs is to be fitted with inverse synthetic-aperture radar (ISAR). ISAR
is a state-of-the-art radar that provides a dual advantage. First, it eases the
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identification problem by displaying a target’s silhouette, a physical image,
which improves the overall effectiveness of tracking and attacking. The other
advantage is variable power output, which makes ISAR difficult to identify via
ESM.
Following the Mumbai terror attacks, the Indian Navy too concluded a deal
with the United States for eight of a new type of LRMP—the Multi-Mission
Maritime Aircraft (MMA, or P-8 Poseidon, the successor to the P-3C). The In-
dian Navy is currently operating older-generation LRMPs, Russian Il-38s and
Tu-142s. The jet-driven Poseidon will be suitably converted for anti-surface-
vessel and antisubmarine roles. The prototype is, however, not likely to roll out
before 2012, after which its true capabilities would be known.
The P-3C is a mainstay of the Pakistan Navy’s offensive arm. With its ad-
vanced weapon and sensor outfit, it gives the Pakistan Navy a clear qualitative
edge over the Indian Navy’s LRMP capability—at least for now. Thanks to its
load-carrying capacity, altitude advantage, and other aerodynamic character-
istics, the P-3C could be armed with land-attack missiles or strategic weapons.
This modification, however, would require specialized equipment—currently
a grey area in the Pakistan Navy. A suitably equipped P-3C could serve as a
powerful backup to an undersea second strike on board Agosta 90Bs. A
well-thought-out employment strategy could render the P-3C a potent con-
stituent of the nuclear triad.
The Medium and Long Terms (beyond Five Years)
The absence of any opposition by the United States or the rest of the interna-
tional community to the prolonged and sustained Russian assistance to India in
the development of a sea-based nuclear deterrent potential was conspicuous.
That is not all; the now-shaping Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has never caused any up-
roar in the West or among the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Besides raising con-
cerns on proliferation, the deal significantly undercuts the efficacy of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.84 This provides Pakistan enough justification
either to lease nuclear submarines or eventually development its own, or both.85
It is not a question of matching nuclear weapon for nuclear weapon but about
preserving stability and ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces. The na-
tional maritime objectives and tasks assigned to the Pakistan Navy may not war-
rant a nuclear submarine in its inventory, but maintenance of deterrence,
particularly in the evolving geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region, certainly
does merit consideration of it.
In China, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is currently involved in
one of the world’s most ambitious submarine expansion and construction pro-
grams. It includes acquisition of conventional submarines, like the Russian Kilo
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(SS), and the construction of the Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN and the Shang-class
(Type 093) SSN. These submarines are expected to be much more modern and
capable than China’s aging older-generation boats.86
In 1983 the PLAN built an eight-thousand-ton Xia-class SSBN, reportedly
armed with twelve JL-1 missiles with a range of a thousand miles. The subma-
rine twice test-fired its missiles but never ventured beyond China’s regional wa-
ters. The new Type 094 Jin, which will replace the single Xia, will carry between
ten and twelve JL-2 SLBMs.87 However, the PLAN has major handicaps in its
limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea or expose these plat-
forms on strategic patrols.88
The once slowly expanding military ties between Beijing and Islamabad have
now matured into a strategic partnership, as is evident from local production of
the JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter, the Al-Khalid tank, and F-22P frigates. This
partnership is further evidenced by the PLAN’s regular participation in the large
multinational AMAN series of exercises hosted by the Pakistan Navy. Pakistan’s
strategic community and Beijing could plan the training and subsequent lease
of a nuclear-powered submarine. The PLAN’s Xia submarine could be an appro-
priate start. A pool of selected Pakistan Navy officers could be trained to operate
an SSBN, with theoretical/academic work ashore followed by operational train-
ing at sea and finally a strategic deployment. Though such a plan seems ambi-
tious and the PLA Navy’s SSBNs rarely prowl far, this remains a viable choice
that would serve the two countries well strategically.89
{LINE-SPACE}
Deterrence is not a passive concept; it must be stepped up in proportion to an
adversary’s increases in arsenal or delivery means. For reasons all too well
known, Pakistan’s principal security perceptions will remain India-centric. To
keep deterrence credible, the indispensability of continuously bolstering Paki-
stan’s nuclear assets, including delivery means, cannot be overstressed. The in-
ternational community would react sharply were Pakistan to field a sea-based
nuclear deterrent, given the country’s security situation and fears of radicaliza-
tion (real or imaginary) in Western minds.90 Timing, therefore, is crucial. Paki-
stan is currently too dependent on the American and multilateral financial
institutions for keeping its economy afloat, and that situation is not likely to al-
ter for the next few years. But if the issue is not addressed, Pakistan’s hard-earned
nuclear stability may erode beyond recovery.
The role of armed forces was once to win a war if diplomacy had failed; in the
nuclear age their role is to prevent warfare from breaking out.91 Despite being on
the wrong side of history, Pakistan has no option but to take some hard
decisions.
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The views expressed are those of the author
and not of the Pakistan Navy or Pakistan
Navy War College, Lahore.
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